Abstract. Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade. We discuss the implications for theory building and for managing the redesign of market trust systems.

Keywords: market design, reputation, trust, reciprocity, eBay

JEL classification: C73, C9, D02, L14
I. Introduction

This paper reports on the repair of an Internet market trust mechanism. While all markets require some minimum amount of trust (Akerlof 1970), it is a particular challenge for Internet markets, where trades are typically anonymous, geographically dispersed, and executed sequentially. To incentivize trustworthiness, Internet markets often employ a reputation-based ‘feedback system’, enabling traders to publicly post information about past transaction partners. Online markets using a feedback system include eBay, Amazon, and RentACoder, among many others. For these markets, feedback systems with their large databases of transaction histories are a core asset, crucial for user loyalty and market efficiency.

Below we will see, based on new data and reports from other researchers, that the feedback information given in the eBay marketplace exhibits a strong reciprocal pattern (Section II). This was a problem because the reciprocity tended to reduce the informativeness of the feedback given and likely hampered market efficiency. We also report on our approach to solving this problem, which combines behavioral economics with an engineering perspective. An engineering study puts the behavioral science to a prescriptive test. Basic theory implies that a reputation system that elicits accurate and complete feedback information can promote trust and cooperation among selfish traders even in such adverse environments as online market platforms (e.g., Wilson 1985, Milgrom et al. 1990). So there is theoretical reason to believe that a properly designed feedback system can effectively facilitate trade. At the same time, the engineering takes us further down the causation chain than present theory goes, to gaming in the production of reputation information. As we will see, reputation builders retaliate for negative reviews, thereby inhibiting the provision of negative reviews in the first place. The resulting bias in reputation information then works its way up the chain, ultimately diminishing market efficiency. This complication challenges the usefulness of the existing concepts of reputation building that abstract away from the endogeneity of feedback production. One of the major advantages of engineering studies is to identify such gaps in existing concepts and to suggest new research questions (see Ostrom 1990 and Roth 2002 for pioneering work along these lines, Milgrom 2004, Roth 2008, and Greiner et al., forthcoming, for matching and auction market design surveys, and Chen et al. 2010 for an intriguing design study of social information flows in an online public good environment).

An engineering study is also a method for vetting how the scientifically developed ideas will affect the marketplace prior to implementation, to reduce the risk to the marketplace of costly mistakes due to unforeseen or underestimated circumstances. In our case, it turned out that the retaliatory behavior on eBay (and other marketplaces) has an institutional trigger in the rules governing feedback timing and observability. Redesigning the feedback system to fix the problem presented three kinds of risks. First, it was not clear how responsive the larger market would be to the fix: In order to be economically effective, the new system need evoke strategically motivated changes in the economic and social behaviors of the traders, both regarding feedback provision and trade conduct, as the information flows through the market. Second, changing the feedback rules risked undesirable side effects. As we will see, reciprocity appears important to getting
(legitimately) satisfactory trades reported; eliminating all opportunities for reciprocity (as some redesigns would do) risked a lurch from under-reporting negative outcomes to over-reporting them. Third, a successful redesign needed to deal with various path dependencies. eBay’s feedback system is synchronized with other parts of the market platform, such as eBay’s conflict resolution system, so that significant changes in one part would often entail major changes in other parts. Risk is inherent to market redesign generally, and so solutions entailing small changes are typically preferred to solutions entailing large changes (Niederle and Roth 2005). The two competing redesigns reflect this principle in that both build on, rather than abandon, the existing system. The Blind feedback proposal changes the timing of feedback disclosure, such that one trader’s feedback cannot be conditioned on the other’s. The DSR system, which eBay eventually adopted, allows buyers to submit additional, one-sided feedback that is not subject to feedback retaliation. Each proposed system has potential advantages and disadvantages (Section II).

Descriptive data from other Internet markets that have feedback systems with features similar to those proposed answer some of our questions (Section III). But not all of them: Behavioral and institutional differences across the markets create substantial ambiguity; one proposal, in particular, has major features not shared with any existing market. Also, we lack field data on the underlying cost and preference parameters in the markets, and so cannot easily measure how feedback systems affect market efficiency. To narrow the uncertainty, we crafted a test bed experiment designed to capture the theoretically relevant aspects of behavior and institutional changes (Section IV). In combination with the field observations, the lab data provide a robust picture of how the proposed fixes can be expected to influence feedback behavior and the larger market system. Our analysis guided eBay in its decision to change the reputation system, which allows us to present preliminary data on how the implemented new field system performs (Section V). The lessons learned in this study appear to extend beyond the scope of eBay’s feedback system since the reputation building mechanisms in many markets and social environments, both online and offline, are vulnerable to feedback retaliation (ex., financial rating services, employee job assessments, word-of-mouth about colleagues). We discuss the implications for theory building about these mechanisms and for managing the design of market trust systems (Section VI).

II. The feedback problem and two proposals to fix it

We first review eBay’s conventional feedback system (Section II.1). We examine evidence, from new data as well as from the work of other researchers, for a reciprocal pattern in feedback giving and for the role of the rules that govern feedback giving (Section II.2). An important point will be that reciprocal behavior appears to have good as well as bad consequences for the system.1 We then discuss two proposals put forward to mitigate the bad consequences (Section II.3).

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1 That said, many (but not all) studies find that feedback has positive value for the market as indicated by positive correlations between the feedback score of a seller and the revenue and the probability of sale. See, for example, Bajari
II.1 EBay’s conventional feedback system

EBay facilitates trade in the form of auctions and posted offers in over thirty countries. In 2007, when we collected our data, 84 million users bought or sold $60 billion in goods on eBay platforms. After each eBay transaction, both the buyer and the seller are invited to give feedback on each other. Until spring 2007 (when the system changed), only “conventional” feedback could be left. Under this system, traders can rate a transaction as positive, neutral, or negative (along with a short text comment). Submitted feedback is immediately posted and available to all traders. Conventional feedback ratings can be removed from the site only by court ruling, or if the buyer did not pay, or if both transaction partners mutually agree to withdrawal.\(^2\)

The most common summary measure of an eBay trader’s feedback history is the feedback score, equal to the difference between the number of positive and negative feedbacks from unique eBay traders (neutral scores are ignored). A trader’s feedback score appears on the site. An important advantage of the feedback score is that it incorporates a reliability measure (experience) in the measure of trustworthiness. The feedback score is also the most commonly used measure of feedback history in research analyses of eBay data.\(^3\)

Observe that the feedback score makes no distinction between a feedback received as a buyer and a feedback received as a seller, giving each equal weight in the aggregation. Many individual feedback scores reflect a mix of seller and buyer feedback. In eBay Dataset 1 (we collected a number of data sets as part of this project and each is described in Appendix B), about 65% of the traders were both buyers and sellers at least once, and 50% have completed five or more transactions in each of both roles.

A second important observation is that most moral hazard worries (the opportunities for violating trust) are on the seller side of the market. The buyer renders payment before the seller ships the good. If the buyer

\(^2\) EBay’s old feedback system was the product of an 11 year evolutionary process. In its first version, introduced in 1996, feedback was not bound to mutual transactions: every community member could give an opinion about every other community member. In 1999/2000 the ability to submit non-transaction related feedback was removed. The percentage of positive feedback as a published aggregate statistic was introduced in 2003, and in 2004 the procedure of mutual feedback withdrawal was added. Since 2005, feedback submitted by eBay users leaving the platform shortly thereafter or not participating in ‘issue resolution processes’ is made ineffective, and members who want to leave neutral or negative feedback must go through a tutorial before being able to do so. Since spring 2007 a new system was introduced, as described in Section V. In 2008, again new features were implemented, which are discussed in Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2011a).

\(^3\) Another common measure is the ‘percentage positive’ equal to the share of positive and negative feedbacks that is positive. For our data, which measure is used makes little difference; we mostly report results using the feedback score.
fails to send payment as he was trusted to do, the seller incurs time costs and probably loses the transaction fee, but still has the good for later sale. In contrast, the buyer has to trust that the seller will ship the good and in a timely manner, that the seller’s description of the good was accurate and that the seller will refund or make good if there are problems.4

II.2 Reciprocal feedback, benefits and costs

Feedback information is largely a public good, helping all traders to manage the risks involved in trusting unknown transaction partners. Yet in our data about 70% of the traders, sellers and buyers alike, leave feedback (a number consistent with previous research).5 In the following, the null hypothesis is always that feedback is given independently, whereas the alternative hypothesis states that feedback is given conditionally, following a reciprocal pattern. The analysis is based on 700,000 completed eBay transactions taken from seven countries and six categories in 2006/07.6

Feedback giving. If feedback were given independently among trading partners, one would expect the percentage of time both partners give feedback to be 70%*70% = 49%. Yet mutual feedback is given much more often, about 64% of the time. The top rows of Table 1 contain two related observations: First, both buyers and sellers are more likely to provide feedback when the transaction partner has given feedback first. Second, the effect is stronger for sellers than for buyers; when a buyer gave feedback, the seller leaves feedback 87.4% of the time, versus 51.4% when the buyer did not leave feedback, yet (in a moment we will see that sellers sometimes have an incentive to wait).

Feedback content. Also observe from Table 1 that there is a high positive correlation between the content of buyer and seller feedback within each country sampled. There are likely a number of reasons for this; for example, a problematic transaction might leave both sides dissatisfied. But Table 1 also provides a first hint

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4 The text presents a somewhat simplified account of the buyer moral hazard issue. We gathered some anecdotal evidence for buyer moral hazard from our surveys with eBay traders conducted jointly with eBay, from eBay’s online feedback forum and from eBay seller conferences. There are four themes: (i) The buyer purchases the item, but never sends the payment, as noted in the text. (ii) The buyer has unsubstantiated complains about the item. (iii) The buyer blackmails the seller regarding feedback. (iv) After two months the buyer asks the credit card provider to retrieve the payment (eBay’s payment service PayPal does not provide support in these cases). However, beyond anecdotal cases along these lines, buyer moral hazard appeared not to be the critical challenge for eBay and eBay users that seller moral hazard is.

5 The number varies somewhat across categories and countries. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) found that buyers gave feedback in 51.7% of the cases, and sellers in 60.6%. Cabral and Hortacaşcu (2010) report a feedback frequency from buyer to seller in 2002/03 of 40.7% in 1,053 auctions of coins, notebooks and Beanie Babies. In their 2002 dataset of 51,062 completed rare coin auctions on eBay, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) observed feedback frequencies of 67.8% for buyers and 77.5% for sellers.

6 Appendix B contains a list of the field datasets used in this paper. In our description of the field data that motivate our experiment, here as well as in Section V, we report mostly descriptives and simple correlations rather than more in-depth regression analysis. We believe that, given the number of observations and the economic size of the reported effects, such 'eye-ball tests' combined with the cited evidence from other studies will be sufficient to convince readers that reciprocity is an issue. Moreover, our laboratory study provides complementary and highly controlled evidence for these phenomena. While not reported here, regressions of feedback behavior (e.g., feedback probability, timing, and content) on observables, controlling for various factors such as country and product category, do confirm our findings (see Ariely et al. 2005, and Kagel and Roth 2005, for a similar approach of complementing field with laboratory data).


**Table 1: Feedback Giving and Content, Conditional Probabilities and Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feedback giving probability</th>
<th>Partner did not yet give FB</th>
<th>Partner gave FB already</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buyer</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seller</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kendall’s tau correlations between seller’s and buyer’s feedback**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>tau</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Tau</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Tau</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Tau</th>
<th>FB giving correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>458,249</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>139,772</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>318,477</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>725,735</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>20,928</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>14,888</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>31,990</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8,474</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>5,377</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>12,301</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>24,933</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>8,095</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>16,838</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>39,104</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>133,957</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>45,836</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>88,121</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>192,565</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>93,266</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>31,316</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>61,950</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>143,877</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>176,009</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>45,133</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>130,876</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>302,213</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Observations where feedback was eventually withdrawn are not included in correlations. In the cell marked with “-”, the standard deviation is zero. All other correlations are highly significant.

that reciprocity in feedback content has a strategic element: If feedback were given independently, the correlation between seller and buyer content, as measured by tau, should be about the same when the seller gives second as when the seller gives first. In fact, the correlation is about twice as high when the seller gives second. The pattern is similar across countries.

**Feedback timing.** If feedback timing were independent among trading partners, one would expect the timing of buyer and seller feedback to be uncorrelated with content. But this is not the case: Figure 1 shows the distribution of feedback timing for those transactions where both traders actually left feedback. The green dots represent the timing of mutually positive feedback. More than 70% of all these observations are located below the 45-degree line, indicating that in most cases the seller gives feedback after the buyer. The red dots visualize observations of mutually problematic feedback. Here, the sellers’ feedback is given second in more than 85% of the cases. Moreover, mutually reciprocal feedback is much more heavily clustered alongside the 45-degree line as compared to the case of non-reciprocal feedback. For instance, a seller who gives negative feedback does so much faster after the buyer gave negative feedback than after the buyer gave positive feedback: the median number of days since the buyer gave negative feedback (standard deviation) is 0.77 (11.1), and 2.98 (17.9) if he gave positive feedback. All these differences in timing are significant at all conventional levels.

The tightness and sequence in timing suggest that sellers reciprocate positive feedback and ‘retaliate’ negative feedback. Seller retaliation also explains why more than 70% of cases in which the buyer gives
problematic feedback and the seller gives positive feedback (blue dots in Figure 1), involve the buyer giving second – the buyer going first would involve a high risk of retaliation. Observations in which only the seller gives problematic feedback (yellow dots) are rare and have their mass below the 45-degree line.

Why do sellers retaliate negative feedback? Existing theory and laboratory studies on reputation building, while not developed in the context of the production of reputation information, suggest multiple strategic and social motives (and these dovetail well with anecdotal and survey evidence that we have collected).\(^7\) Some retaliation is probably driven by social preferences or emotional arousal: The buyer's negative feedback harms the seller's reputation and this triggers the buyer to respond in kind. Retaliating negative feedback may also help to deter negative feedback in the future, because retaliation is viewable by

\[^7\] See, e.g., Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), Greif (1989), Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Neral and Ochs (1992), Brandts and Figueras (2003), and Bolton et al. (2004) for the strategic role in reciprocity, and Fehr and Gächter (2000), as well as the surveys in Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) and Camerer (2003) for the social aspect in reciprocity. Herrmann, Thōni, and Gächter (2008) provide cross-cultural evidence for anti-social reciprocity in laboratory experiments where high contributors to public goods are punished by low contributors.
buyers in a seller’s feedback history. Also, giving a negative feedback increases the probability that the opponent will agree to mutually withdraw the feedback.

**The benefits and cost of reciprocal feedback.** The main benefit of reciprocal feedback, for both the individual traders involved and the larger system, is that it helps getting mutually beneficial trades recorded. A common buying experience on eBay, after a transaction has gone smoothly, is to receive a note from the seller saying he gave you positive feedback and asking you to provide feedback, or saying that he would give you feedback once you left feedback on him (playing or initiating a kind of "trust game"). The data (top of Table 1) suggests that this is an effective tactic for reputation building. It is good for the system too because mutually satisfactory trading experiences get recorded.

But in the form of seller retaliation, reciprocal feedback imposes costs both on the buyers retaliated against and potentially on the larger system. With regard to buyers, it hurts them in future trading circumstances where there might be buyer moral hazard (although as noted, this is not frequent). But also recall that many buyers become sellers (Section II.1) and so negative feedback can hurt them in that role, too. Also, buyers (as with any eBay member) seem to put a high value on their profile, for reasons that cannot be fully explained with only strategic motives (Ockenfels and Resnick, forthcoming). With regard to the larger system, the worry is that it has a chilling effect on buyers’ reporting bad experiences out of fear that it will be retaliated. This would bias feedback information to being overly positive and therefore less informative in identifying problem sellers. The fact that from 742,829 eBay users (Dataset 1; Appendix B), who received at least one feedback, 67% have a percentage positive of 100%, and 80.5% have a percentage positive of greater than 99%, provides suggestive support for the bias. The observation is in line with Dellarocas and Wood (2008) who examine the information hidden in the cases where feedback is not given. They estimate, under some auxiliary assumptions, that buyers are at least mildly dissatisfied in about 21% of all eBay transactions, far higher than the levels suggested by the reported feedback. They argue that many buyers do not submit feedback at all because of the potential risk of retaliation.

Other studies provide complementary evidence on the social and strategic aspects of feedback production. Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kuwabara (2000) and Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) observe strong correlations between buyer and seller feedback in their eBay field data. The analysis above replicates this finding. Regarding feedback giving, Bolton and Ockenfels (2011) report a controlled field experiment conducted on eBay with experienced eBay traders. They find that sellers who did not share the gains from trade in an equitable manner received significantly less feedback than sellers who shared equitably. This finding lends additional credence to the suspicion that fear of retaliation is a factor behind dissatisfied buyers staying silent. On a more general level, there is evidence for a common and strong tendency for lenient and compressed performance ratings, as discussed for instance in the literature on the “leniency bias” and “centrality bias” in human resource management (Bretz, Milkovich, and Read 1992, Prendergast and Topel
Regarding feedback timing, Jian et al. (2010) recently confirm that buyers and sellers on eBay often employ a conditional strategy of giving feedback. Exploiting information about the timing of feedback provision when the partner does not provide feedback, they estimate that, under auxiliary assumptions, feedback is conditional 20-23% of the time. Ockenfels and Resnick (forthcoming) provide a more extensive survey of the literature. Overall, this literature, based on a variety of field data sets, is consistent with the patterns of social and strategic feedback usage that we find in our data, and provide the starting point of our engineering approach.

II. 3 Two alternative redesign proposals

Any institutional change in a running market must respect certain path dependencies. This is particularly true for reputation systems, which by their nature connect the past with the future. For this reason, the redesign proposals we consider carry forward (in some form) the conventional ratings of the existing system, allowing traders to basically maintain their reputation built before the change. At the same time, each proposal attacks one or the other of two features that appear to facilitate retaliation behavior, either the open, sequential posting that allows a trading partner to react to the feedback information, or the two-way nature of the ratings that allows sellers to retaliate buyers.

Proposal 1. Make conventional feedback double blind. That is, conventional feedback would only be revealed after both traders submitted feedback or after the deadline for feedback submission expired. Thus, a trader cannot condition her feedback on the feedback of her transaction partner’s, thereby excluding sequential reciprocity and strategic timing, making seller retaliation more difficult. The conjecture is that this will lead to more accurate feedback. A double blind system of this sort has been suggested by Güth, Mengel, and Ockenfels (2007), Reichling (2004) and Klein et al. (2007), among others. A major risk with a double blind system concerns whether it will diminish the frequency of feedback giving, particularly with regard to mutually satisfactory transactions. Because trading partners effectively give feedback simultaneously, giving a positive feedback could not be used to induce a trading partner to do the same. Another issue is that a seller can game the system by preventing the publication of received feedback, potentially of value to other traders, until the end of the feedback deadline by not submitting feedback herself.

Proposal 2. Supplement the existing conventional feedback system with a one-sided feedback option enabling buyers to give a detailed seller rating (DSR). In principle, a one-sided system in which only the buyer gives feedback is the surest

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8 Another example for the consideration of path dependency in practical reputation system design can be found on Amazon.com. When changing its ranking of voluntary book reviewers in 2008, Amazon retained its classical system (tracking lifetime quantity of reviews) while adding new measures to reflect the quality of reviews.

9 Other options were considered in the process of developing “Feedback 2.0”, but were discarded relatively quickly in favor of the two explored here. Most notably, we considered a system that only has feedback given by buyers, or strictly separates feedback earned as a seller and feedback earned as a buyer (discussed in Bolton et al. 2011a). Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005) propose a scoring system which makes reporting honest feedback in the absence of other feedback-distorting incentives part of a strict Nash equilibrium, but do not consider the problem of reciprocally biased feedback.
way to end seller retaliation. Such a system has been proposed by Chwelos and Dhar (2007), among others. But while there is more scope for moral hazard on the seller side than on the buyer side in eBay’s marketplace, there might be room for buyer moral hazard as well. Moreover, gaining positive feedback as a buyer appears to be an important step for many traders in their transition to a successful seller. For these reasons, the proposal was to create a detailed seller rating system to supplement the conventional feedback system: Conventional feedback would be published immediately as usual, but (only) the buyer would have the option to leave additional feedback, blind to the seller.10 A possible negative consequence is that the conventional and DSR feedback given to sellers might diverge, with unhappy buyers giving positive conventional feedback to avoid seller retaliation, and then being truthful with the (blind) DSR score. This might not be a problem for experienced traders who would know to pay exclusive attention to DSR scores. But it might make it harder and more costly for new eBay traders to learn how to interpret reputation profiles. For some traders, the inconsistency might damage the institutional credibility of the feedback system.

III. Descriptive evidence from other Internet markets

As a first step in evaluating the two proposals, we searched for and examined systems involving double blind and one-sided feedback in other Internet markets. The benefit of field data is that we can study behavior in naturally evolved environments. At the same time, there are limitations to the conclusions we can draw. We first review the data then discuss the limitations.

We start with data culled from two markets with double blind systems similar to the Proposal 1 system (Section II.3). The first field evidence comes from eBay’s own market in Brazil. MercadoLivre began in 1999 as an independent market, eBay-like in its objective but with some unique trading procedures. EBay bought the market in 2001 and decided to keep some procedures, including a double blind feedback system. MercadoLivre reveals submitted feedback after a 21-day “blind period” that starts upon completion of the transaction. No feedback can be given after the blind period has lapsed.

Table 2 shows feedback statistics based on a total of 24,435 completed transactions in Dataset 3 (see Appendix B), which was specifically compiled to compare feedback behavior in eBay’s conventional feedback system to other eBay sites (the verified buyer breakout for eBay China will be taken up below). Observe that the share of problematic (negative, neutral, and withdrawn) feedback given on MercadoLivre is multiple times

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10 Another advantage is that we can fine-tune the scaling of the new ratings without disrupting the 3-point conventional ratings; the latter would create a number of path dependency problems. Research in psychology suggests that Likert scaling of 5 or 7 points is optimal (e.g., Nunnally 1978; and more recently Muniz, Garcia-Cueto, and Lozano 2005). Additionally, several studies have found that users generally prefer to rate on more categories rather than submitting just one general rating (e.g., Oppenheim 2000). We describe the economic effects of scaling in Section IV.4. The specific method for posting detailed seller ratings is best understood in the context of a number of practical considerations and is described at the beginning of Section V.
higher than on other mature eBay platforms that do not employ a blind feedback system. Moreover, while the correlation of feedback content differs little from that in other markets (Column 7 in Table 2), the correlation of feedback giving is much lower in Brazil than in the U.S., Germany, or China (Column 8 in Table 2). That is, in those cases where both transaction partners leave feedback, the content in Brazil is as correlated as in the other countries, but the probability of two-way feedback giving is much smaller. One worry we raised with a double blind system is that diminishing reciprocal opportunities might diminish the rate at which traders leave feedback. But MercadoLivre provides no evidence that double blind decreases participation; the feedback frequency of 71% for buyers is in line with what we observe in other countries, and with 88% sellers provide even more feedback.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Feedback frequency, content and correlation on Mercado Livre and eBay China compared to other eBay platforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>eBay U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eBay Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>eBay China</td>
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<tr>
<td>… verified buyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… unverified buyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MercadoLivre Brazil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All correlations are highly significant.

Figure 2: Feedback frequency and correlations before and after the system change in April 2005 on RentACoder.com
The RentACoder.com site enables software coders to bid for contracts offered by software buyers. RentACoder.com used to have a two-sided, open feedback system, similar to eBay, but switched to a double blind system in May 2005. RentACoder’s motive for the switch (as stated on its help page) is the potential threat of retaliatory feedback in an open system. The double blind system allows buyers and coders to leave feedback on one another within a period of two weeks after completion of a project.

The RentACoder.com panel data (Dataset 4, see Appendix B) comprises 192,392 transactions. Unlike the MercadoLivre comparison, it allows for a within-site comparison, keeping all institutions but the feedback system fixed, and allowing an analysis of the transition from an open to a double blind system. The transition has no significant effect on average feedback content received by either buyers or sellers, although there is a weakly significant, small increase in the standard deviation of feedback received by buyers. There are, however, other effects indicative of diminishing reciprocity. First, as shown in Figure 2, the monthly correlation between feedback content sharply and significantly drops from an average of 0.62 in the 15 months before the change to 0.21 in the 21 months after the change. We also observe from Figure 2 (and backed by time series regressions controlling for trends), that coders get significantly less feedback after introduction of double blind feedback, while buyers get a small but significant increase.

The MercadoLivre and RentACoder data is consistent with the claim that a double blind feedback system leads to buyers giving more discerning feedbacks, with less correlation of feedback between trading partners. The evidence on changes in the frequency of feedback giving is mixed, with the MercadoLivre system showing a high degree of feedback giving while the introduction of the RentACoder double blind system was followed by a decrease in feedback giving.

The second set of field evidence comes from markets with one-way feedback systems, each similar in some respects to the Proposal 2 system (Section II.3). The first evidence comes from a within-platform comparison on the Chinese eBay site, where there is a large proportion of so-called “unverified buyers” – buyers who did not provide proof of their identity (yet). Feedback given by unverified buyers does not count towards the seller’s reputation. Thus, from a reciprocity perspective, giving feedback to unverified buyers is much like giving one-sided feedback. Table 2 shows frequency and content of feedback for verified and unverified buyers. We observe that verified buyers receive and give about five times as much feedback as unverified buyers ($\chi^2 = 82.6, p < 0.001$) and that feedback giving is much more correlated with verified buyers (the correlation coefficients are 0.460 versus 0.682).

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11 Because of space limitations, we omit the regressions of time series of monthly averages on constant, time trend and blindness dummy, which confirm the observation.
12 Moreover, unverified buyers receive a neutral or negative feedback 14.7% of the time in our sample, whereas verified buyers receive a negative feedback only 4.9% of the time ($\chi^2 = 2.82, p = 0.093$), suggesting that a one-sided system will elicit less positive (and probably more accurate) feedback. However, here, the causality appears to be less clear.
More evidence comes from Amazon.de, which has a one-sided buyer-to-seller feedback system (Dataset 5, a sample of 320,609 feedbacks, see Appendix B).\textsuperscript{13} In addition, we conducted a small email-based survey with a subset of sellers in our sample. Taking the survey responses of 91 Amazon sellers and the field data together, we find that feedback is left by buyers in about 41\% of transactions; if we weight the answers by number of transactions, we get a 36\% figure (implying that very active sellers get somewhat less feedback), about half the rate of feedback on the various eBay platforms. We also observe that Amazon feedback exhibits higher variance than does eBay’s conventional feedback in the sense that only 81.5\% of feedback is given in the best category of 5, while middle and low feedback of 4, 3, 2, and 1 is given in 14.5\%, 2.2\%, 1.0\%, and 0.9\% of all cases, respectively.

The Chinese eBay and Amazon.de data is consistent with the claim that a one-sided feedback system leads to buyers giving more discerning feedback. At the same time, both markets reinforce the suspicion that removing the opportunity for reciprocal feedback from the system lowers feedback frequency.

Altogether, the field data is suggestive of the potential both proposed fixes to the eBay system have for generating a more accurate, or at least a more dispersed reflection of trader satisfaction. At the same time, given the highly complex and diverse environments these markets operate in, it is difficult to make clear causal inferences based on the field data alone. For instance, the low level of positive feedback in MercadoLivre may stem from uncontrolled cross-country effects regarding different norms of trading or feedback giving, or from differences in Brazilian payment or postal services. Similarly, a comparison of RentACoder.com with eBay is complicated by the fact that the RentACoder.com feedback is on a 10-point scale, the market is smaller, the bidding process and price mechanism are different (coders bid for contracts and buyers do not need to select the lowest price offer), etc. With regard to the one sided proposal, neither the Chinese eBay site nor Amazon.de site share the two-way reporting component of the proposed DSR system (in fact, we know of no system with this combined feature).

Along the same lines, and just as important, the field data provide no direct evidence that the reduction in reciprocity improves either the informativeness of feedback or market efficiency. One reason to wonder is that the market in the sample closest to the eBay markets in question, MercadoLivre, exhibits a far higher rate of negative feedback than any other market.\textsuperscript{14} Another reason is the relatively low rates of feedback giving in

\textsuperscript{13} Strictly speaking, both sellers and buyers on Amazon are able to submit feedback on each other. However, feedback given to buyers is not accessible to other sellers, while feedback to sellers is published publicly. As a result, sellers typically do not leave feedback. This makes Amazon’s system effectively a one-sided one.

\textsuperscript{14} One response to this concern is that the rate of negative feedback on MercadoLivre accords well with rates of unhappiness uncovered by research (ex., Dellarocas and Wood 2008). However, as the experiment reported in the next section makes clear, we should expect more informative feedback to ignite a number of endogenous effects in the system, starting with buyers better identifying and shunning untrustworthy sellers, and so the proportion of unsatisfactory trades should be something less than the present rate of unhappiness.
some of the markets with double blind or one-sided feedback: a substantial drop in feedback giving might raise its own credibility issues, effectively substituting one trust problem for another. With the exception of RentACoder.com, there is little in the way of before and after data to guide such an analysis.

IV. The laboratory study

The experiment speaks to the limitations of the field evidence discussed at the end of the last section. Accordingly, the experiment is designed as a level playing field for comparing the performance of the competing feedback system proposals. Experimental controls help us identify the role of reciprocal behavior in the context of feedback giving, and establish causal relationships between feedback and market performance (e.g., efficiency). To do these things, the experiment needs to abstract away from a number of features that arise in the natural environments. We will argue that the combined laboratory and field data make for a more compelling engineering argument than either kind of data in isolation.

Section IV.1 outlines the experimental design. Section IV.2 shows that the laboratory feedback behavior we observe mirrors key field observations from the conventional system, and that different systems lead to different feedback behaviors. Section IV.3 measures the impact of the feedback system on the economic performance of the auction market. Section IV.4 shows how market performance is connected to feedback informativeness. Section IV.5 discusses what the combined lab and field data tell us.

IV.1 Experimental design and a hypothesis

The experiment simulates a market where there is seller moral hazard (but not buyer moral hazard, as explained in a moment), and includes an auction component that is held fixed across all treatments, while the feedback component is varied to capture the various scopes for reciprocity across alternative feedback systems.

Auction component. Each treatment simulates a market that consists of 60 rounds. In each round participants are matched in groups of four, one seller and three potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ receives a private valuation for the good, $v_i$, publicly known to be independently drawn from a uniform distribution of integers between 100 and 300 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). Buyers simultaneously submit bids of at least 100 ECU or withdraw from bidding. The bidder with the highest bid (earliest bid in case of a tie) wins the auction and pays a price $p$ equal to the second highest bid plus a 1 ECU increment, or his own bid, whichever is smaller. If there is only one bid, the price is set to the 100 ECU start price. After the auction, all participants in the group are informed of the price and of all bids but the highest. The price is shown to the seller $s$ who then

---

15 Our experimental design, including features such as the handling of increments and the information provided to bidders, are chosen analogously to eBay’s rules. However, for simplicity, we chose a sealed-bid format and abstracted away from eBay’s bidding dynamics, which is known to create incentives for strategic timing in bidding (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).
determines the quality of the good $q_i \in \{0, .01, \ldots, .99, 1\}$. Permitting quality choice is a simplification of the many potential dimensions of seller moral hazard in the field, like inaccurate item descriptions, long delivery time, low quality, etc. The payoff (not including feedback costs described below) to the seller is $\pi_S = p - 100q_i$ and to the winning buyer $i$ is $\pi_i = q_i v_i - p$.

There were 32 participants in a session and two sessions per treatment. Eight sequences of random parameters (valuations, role and group matching), involving 8 participants each, were created in advance. Thus, random group re-matching was restricted to pools of 8 subjects, yielding four “sub-sessions” per session and 8 statistically independent observations per treatment. To ensure a steady growth of experience and feedback, random role matching was additionally restricted such that each participant became a seller twice every 8 rounds. The same 8 random game sequences were used in all treatments. Participants were not informed about the matching restriction.

**Feedback component.** When the auction ends in a trade, both buyer and seller have the opportunity to give voluntary feedback on the transaction partner. Giving feedback costs the giver 1 ECU, reflecting the small effort costs when submitting feedback. Because our primary interest was long-run effects, and not transitional dynamics, we had each subject experience only one feedback system. The underlying assumption here is that there is little in the way of behavioral path dependencies that affect long run performance.

In the Baseline treatment, both the seller and the buyer can submit conventional feedback (CF), rating the transaction as negative, neutral, or positive. Feedback giving ends with a “soft close”: In a first stage, both transaction partners have the opportunity to give feedback. If both or neither give feedback, then both are informed about the outcome and the feedback stage ends. If only one gives feedback, the other is informed about that feedback and enters the second feedback stage where he has again the option to give feedback, and so a chance to react to the other’s feedback.\(^{16}\) As on eBay, a trader’s conventional feedback is aggregated over both buyer and seller roles as the feedback score and the percentage of positive feedbacks (cf. Section II). When the participant becomes a seller, these scores are presented to potential buyers on the auction screen prior to bidding.

The Blind treatment differs from the Baseline only in that we omit the second feedback stage. That is, buyer and seller give feedback simultaneously, not knowing the other’s choice.

The D3R (Detailed Seller Rating) treatment adds a rating to the Baseline treatment feedback system. After giving CF, the buyer (and only the buyer) is asked to rate the statement “The quality was satisfactory” on a 5-point Likert scale: “I don’t agree at all”, “I don’t agree”, “I am undecided”, “I agree”, “I agree completely”.

---

\(^{16}\) This mirrors the feedback strategies admitted on eBay in simplified form. On eBay, there is always a possibility to respond to submitted feedback. So the basic types of strategies a trader can pursue are: do not submit feedback at all, submit unconditional feedback, or submit feedback conditional on other’s feedback and otherwise don’t submit. Our soft close design captures these strategic options. Ariely, Ockenfels, and Roth (2005) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) model the ending rule of Amazon.com auctions in a similar way, allowing buyers to always respond to other bids.
As in the Baseline treatment, we implement a soft close design, but in case the seller delays and enters the second feedback stage, she is only informed about the conventional feedback given by the buyer, not about the detailed quality rating. Number and average of received detailed seller ratings are displayed at the auction page.

All sessions took place in April 2007 in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. Participants were recruited using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Overall 192 students (average age 23.8 years, 49% male) participated in 6 sessions. After reading instructions (see Appendix A) and asking questions, participants took part in two non-interactive practice rounds. Each participant received a starting balance of 1,000 ECU to cover potential losses. Sessions lasted between 1½ and 2 hours. At the end of the experiment, the ECU balance was converted to Euros at a rate of 200 ECU = 1 Euro, and was paid out in cash. Participants earned 17.55 Euros on average (standard deviation = 2.84), including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros and 4 Euros bonus for filling in a post-experiment questionnaire.

Hypothesis. The experiment has a finite number of trading rounds. Assuming that all agents are commonly known to be selfish and rational, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in all treatments of the experiment stipulates zero feedback giving and quality tendered, with no auction bids. The socially efficient outcome has the bidder with the highest valuation winning the auction, the seller producing 100% quality, with no (costly) feedback giving. So both of these, rather extreme, scenarios leave no role for the feedback system. If, as seems more likely, feedback is used to build up reputation and to discriminate between sellers, we hypothesize that reciprocal feedback hampers market efficiency because reciprocity compresses reputation scores in a way that makes it harder for buyers to discriminate between sellers; these sellers then have less incentive to deliver good quality. Consequently, the two proposed redesigns, if they diminish the role of reciprocity, should do better.

It is important to note that the experiment focuses on seller moral hazard, excluding buyer moral hazard since each winning bid is automatically transferred to the seller. So feedback given by sellers cannot have grounds in the transaction itself. Three considerations guided us in this design choice. First, on eBay, the scope for buyer moral hazard is relatively small (Section II.1). Second, seller retaliation for negative feedback was perceived a much larger problem for eBay than was buyer retaliation; a perception confirmed by Figure 1, 17

17 For an overview on different modeling approaches to seller reputation see Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008). There is also an experimental literature testing reputation theory; more recent contributions include Grosskopf and Sarin (2010), allowing for reputation to have either beneficial or harmful effect on the long-run player, and Bolton et al. (2011b), searching for information externalities in reputation building in markets with partners and strangers matching, as predicted by sequential equilibrium theory. These as well as other papers (see references cited therein) come to the conclusion that reputation building often interacts with social preferences in subtle ways, often (but not always) making reputation mechanisms more beneficial than predicted by theory based on selfish behavior. Our study complements this literature by showing how reciprocity can both hamper and promote the effectiveness of reputation mechanisms.
where 85% of mutually negative feedback begins with the buyer going first.\textsuperscript{18} Third, not admitting buyer moral hazard removes an important confound in interpreting negative feedback given by the seller. In the experiment, negative feedback given by the seller is clearly retaliatory feedback. Negative seller feedback also imposes a cost on the buyer in the form of potentially adverse affects of the buyer’s future profits as a seller, as is the case for a majority of traders on eBay (Section II.1).

\textit{IV.2 Feedback Behavior}

In this section, we investigate whether the feedback pattern in the \textit{Baseline} treatment mirrors the pattern observable in the field, and how the feedback behavior in the alternative systems compares. Unless indicated otherwise, any statistical tests reported here and in subsequent sections are two-tailed Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks tests relying on the (paired) fully independent matching group averages.

\textit{Feedback giving.} In the \textit{Baseline} treatment, buyers give feedback in about 80% and sellers in about 60% of the cases, with an average of about 70%. Relative to \textit{Baseline}, \textit{Blind} exhibits significant drops in both buyer (68%) and seller (34%) giving frequencies ($p < 0.025$ in both cases), whereas \textit{DSR} exhibits only minor and insignificant reductions for both buyers (77%) and sellers (57%; $p > 0.640$ in both cases).\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Feedback timing.} When possible, sellers are more likely than buyers to wait until the other has given feedback (Table 3; $p < 0.025$ both in \textit{Baseline} and \textit{DSR}). This effect is most pronounced when feedback is mutually neutral/negative; the only case with buyers more often moving second is when the buyer gives a problematic and the seller a positive conventional feedback (see Table 9 in Appendix C for details). These interaction patterns of feedback content and timing are very similar to what is observed in the field (Section II), and thereby reassures us of the suitability of our experimental design of the \textit{CF} feedback component.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Timing of Feedback}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & \textit{Baseline} & \textit{Blind} & \textit{DSR} \\
\hline
Both first round & 27\% & 26\% & 29\% \\
None first round & 16\% & 24\% & 15\% \\
Seller 1\textsuperscript{st}, buyer in 2\textsuperscript{nd} & 4\% & 2\% & \\
Seller 1\textsuperscript{st}, Buyer not (in 2\textsuperscript{nd}) & 5\% & 8\% & 8\% \\
Buyer 1\textsuperscript{st}, seller in 2\textsuperscript{nd} & 24\% & 17\% & \\
Buyer 1\textsuperscript{st}, Seller not (in 2\textsuperscript{nd}) & 23\% & 42\% & 28\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{18} On eBay, there are additional strategic reasons for reciprocity in feedback giving, having to do, say, with building up a reputation of being a ‘retaliator’. Our experiment, does not provide the information necessary to employ such complex strategies. The experiment shows that the more direct reciprocal concerns are sufficient to capture much of what we see in the field. To the extent traders employ more complex reciprocal strategies in the field, our experiment tends to underestimate the effect from feedback reciprocation.

\textsuperscript{19} Regression analyses considering interaction effects of treatments with quality support the finding (Table 8 in Appendix C), and furthermore show that buyers give significantly more often feedback when quality is low in both alternative designs. We discuss feedback giving correlations below.
**Table 4: Kendall Tau Correlations Between Seller and Buyer Feedback by Timing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both 1st</th>
<th>B 1st, B 2nd</th>
<th>B 1st, S 2nd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.730†</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All correlations highly significant at the 0.1% level, except for cell indicated by † which is weakly significant at the 10% level.

**Feedback content.** Table 4 shows correlations between conventional feedbacks across treatments. We find that blindness of feedback significantly decreases the correlation compared to the open systems. The high correlations in the latter are mainly driven by the cases where sellers delay their feedback and give second, while when both transaction partners give feedback in the first stage, correlations are comparable to blind feedback. However, correlations of simultaneously submitted feedback are significantly different from zero, too.

**Negative feedback.** Finally, the probit estimates in Table 5 show the determinants of problematic feedback given to sellers conditional on the buyer giving feedback (where, as before, problematic feedback is defined as either a negative or neutral feedback). Model 1 shows that there is no significant treatment effect overall. But from Model 2, controlling for quality, price and other factors, we see that problematic conventional feedback increases in both Blind and DSR. The coefficient estimates for the two treatment dummies are nearly identical, indicating that the size of the effect is about the same in both treatments.\(^{20}\) The reason for more negative feedback is that buyers receiving poor quality are more likely to give problematic feedback under the alternative systems. More specifically, Figure 3 illustrates that in all treatments, a positive conventional feedback (and the highest DSR) is awarded for quality of 100%; likewise, very low quality receives negative feedback in all cases. The major difference between the treatments happens between 40% and 99% quality; here average conventional feedback given is tougher in Blind and DSR. Also observe that the DSRs given generally line up well with the Blind conventional feedback; that is, the DSRs reflect buyer standards similar to those revealed in Blind.

Summing up, the Baseline treatment qualitatively replicates the pattern of strategic timing, retaliation and correlation of feedback found on eBay.\(^{21}\) Moreover, as predicted, the alternative systems successfully mitigate reciprocity (as shown, for instance, by reduced correlations of feedback content) and so allow for a more negative response to lower quality.

---

\(^{20}\) The same probit, run on all successful auction data (not conditional on the buyer giving feedback), yields similar results save the coefficient for the Blind treatment is somewhat smaller (still positive) but insignificant, most likely because of the drop in feedback frequency we observed earlier for that treatment. The share of positive (negative) buyer-to-seller feedback is 53% (44%) in CF, 47% (48%) in Blind, and 55% (37%) in DSR. Also see the discussion in Section IV.4 on the informativeness of conventional and detailed seller rating information in DSR.

\(^{21}\) There are two major exceptions. First, there is no endgame effect in the field. Second, we have more negative feedback compared to eBay. This is desirable because it magnifies the object of our study, feedback retaliation.
TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF PROBLEMATIC FEEDBACK CONDITIONAL ON FEEDBACK GIVEN, PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL EFFECTS (dY/dX) (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff (StdErr)</td>
<td>Coeff (StdErr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td>0.055 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.077 ** (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.058)</td>
<td>0.077 ** (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 ** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001 *** (0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.009 *** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Conventional Feedback Score</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.006 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>1725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted LL</td>
<td>-1183.6</td>
<td>-558.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Problematic feedback includes both neutral and negative feedback. Blind and DSR are treatment dummies. S Feedback Score denotes the feedback score of the seller.

IV.3 Quality, Prices, and Efficiency

The hypothesis underlying our redesign efforts is that the extent to which feedback is shaped by reciprocity affects economic outcomes. More specifically, we hypothesize that diminishing the role of reciprocity increases quality, prices and efficiency. Figure 4 shows the evolution of quality and auction prices over time: both quality and prices are higher in both DSR and Blind than in Baseline. Applying a one-tailed Wilcoxon test using independent matching group averages, the increases in average quality and price over all rounds are significant for treatment DSR (p = 0.035 and 0.025, respectively), but not for Blind. The test, however, aggregates over all rounds, and there is a sharp end game effect in all treatments, with both quality and prices falling towards zero, consistent with related studies on reputation building in markets (e.g. Selten and Stöcker 1986). Regressions controlling for round and end game effects yield positive treatment effects regarding quality and prices for both DSR and Blind, although only DSR effects are significant (see Price Model 1 and Quality Model 1 in Table 6).

The choice of bid and quality levels affects efficiency. In the Baseline treatment, 47% of the potential value was realized, with losses of 23% and 31% resulting from misallocation and low quality, respectively. Both

---

22 Quality Models 1 and 2 in Table 6 reveal another reciprocity effect, resembling what is frequently observed in trust games: sellers respond to higher price offers with better quality (a 1 ECU price increase comes with a 0.2 percentage point increase of quality). While there is evidence from a controlled field experiment conducted on eBay suggesting that both eBay buyers and sellers may care about reciprocal fairness (Bolton and Ockenfels 2011), we are not aware of any eBay field study investigating whether the final auction price reciprocally affects seller behavior.

23 A misallocation occurs if the bidder with the highest valuation does not win so that welfare is reduced by the difference between the highest valuation and the winner’s valuation (which we define as the seller’s opportunity cost of
alternative systems increase efficiency, yet only DSR does significantly so; there is a 27% increase in efficiency in DSR ($p = 0.027$) compared to Baseline, and a 16% increase in Blind ($p = 0.320$). Both market sides gain (although not significantly so) in the new system: about 45% (56%) of the efficiency gains end up in the sellers' pockets in DSR (Blind), and the rest goes to buyers. So both alternative systems seem to increase price, quality and efficiency, but only DSR improvements are statistically significant. There are changes in the Blind treatment, but they are more subtle, as discussed in the next section.

**Figure 3: Average feedback given after observing quality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avg. CF (bars)</th>
<th>Avg. DSR (line)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="Baseline" alt="Baseline" /></td>
<td><img src="DSR" alt="DSR" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="Blind" alt="Blind" /></td>
<td><img src="DSR" alt="DSR" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For this figure, CF is coded -1 (negative), 0 (neutral), and 1 (positive). DSR is given on a 1-5 integer scale.

We saw in Section IV.2 that both proposed systems lead to less reciprocal feedback, and in Section IV.3 that they lead to improved market outcomes. But how does less reciprocity translate into better market performance? The natural hypothesis is that, for a given quality, less reciprocity in feedback giving generates reputation scores that allow better forecasting of sellers’ future behavior. In fact, Quality Model 2 in Table 6 shows that sellers’ conventional feedback scores in Blind have a significantly higher positive correlation with the quality the seller provides at that point than is the case in Baseline. The positive correlation between quality and conventional feedback scores increases in DSR as well, but not significantly so. Observe, however, that the DSRs are significantly positively correlated with quality and so, in this sense, the DSR seller scores, as well as those in Blind, exhibit less distortion than those in Baseline.

100 when there is no winner because of lack of bids. Low quality leads to an efficiency loss because each percent quality the seller does not deliver reduces welfare gains by one percent of the auction winner’s valuation, minus one. Also, each feedback reduces welfare by 1 ECU, but this source of efficiency loss is negligible as in no treatment feedback costs exceed 1% of maximal efficiency.
FIGURE 4: AVERAGE AUCTION PRICE AND SELLERS’ QUALITY CHOICES OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>(StdErr)</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>(StdErr)</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>(StdErr)</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>(StdErr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>(9.182)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>(11.199)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>20.02</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(6.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.89</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>(7.881)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore*Blind</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>(1.696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore*DSR</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.201)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.604</td>
<td>(1.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S DSR Avg</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(1.970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>(1.847)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 2283  2283  2283  2283
Restricted LL: -8098.4  -7933.2  -11032.8  -11038.7

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Blind and DSR are treatment dummies. S FScore denotes the (conventional) feedback score of the seller, and S DSR Avg the seller’s average DSR score. Ai and Norton (2003) observe that the Tobit interaction effects reported by standard statistical software can be inaccurate because of the non-linearity of the model. We ran OLS models with random effects as robustness tests and results are largely the same.


### TABLE 7: DETERMINANTS OF SELLER AVERAGE FUTURE PROFIT, TOBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL EFFECTS (dy/dx)

(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Seller average future profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef</td>
<td>(StdErr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>*** (0.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore*Blind</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>* (0.748)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore*DSR</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>*** (0.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S DSR Avg</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>*** (1.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality*Baseline</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality*Blind</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>** (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality*DSR</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>*** (0.0478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nosale</td>
<td>-53.92</td>
<td>*** (5.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2400
Restricted LL = -11398.2  -11180.5

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Blind and DSR are treatment dummies. S FScore denotes the feedback score of the seller, and S DSR Avg the average DSR score. The Period variable is omitted because the associated coefficient is small and insignificant. Ai and Norton (2003) observe that the Tobit interaction effects reported by standard statistical software can be inaccurate because of the non-linearity of the model. We ran OLS models with random effects as robustness tests and results are largely the same.

### IV.4 The relationship between feedback informativeness and improvement in market performance

We expect that introducing one of the alternative systems leads sellers to react to better feedback informativeness by shipping higher quality in Blind and DSR compared to Baseline. Returning again to Table 6, the Price Model 2 shows that nominally equivalent conventional feedback scores in Baseline and Blind lead to higher prices in the latter case. In comparing Baseline and DSR, there is little difference in regard to conventional feedback impact on price; however, DSRs are significantly positively correlated with price, and in this sense sellers with good feedback scores are more highly rewarded in treatment DSR than in Baseline. More evidence comes from looking directly at the effect a quality decision has on a seller’s future average profit. Model 1 in Table 7 shows that the amount of quality a Baseline seller chooses in the present round drives up future average profit, but not significantly so. In contrast, the amount of quality a Blind or DSR seller chooses drives up their future expected profit by a higher and significant amount, and by about the same amount for both treatments.24

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24 As a side note, observe that Model 2 in Table 7 shows that knowing a seller’s feedback score has greater value for forecasting a seller’s future average profit than does knowing the quality decision they make in the present round, in all three treatments. That is, a summary statistic of a seller’s feedback history is a better predictor of his future profitability than observing directly what he did in the present.
Similarly, a positive feedback score yields stronger incentives to trust in Blind and DSR compared to Baseline. For each treatment separately, we ran an OLS regression with buyer payoff as the dependent variable and the conventional feedback score as the sole explanatory variable, and used the estimated model to compute the minimal feedback score such that a risk-neutral buyer is better off trusting the seller (for given prices in each respective treatment). For Baseline conventional feedback, the buyer should trust if the feedback score is at least 6. For Blind and DSR the number falls to 1. So there is good reason to trust a seller with a(n) positive feedback score in Blind and DSR, but not in the conventional feedback system. The result also suggests that the proposed systems make it easier for new sellers to build up trust and business.

Another way to measure the informativeness of the system is in terms of the amount of confidence we can have that the feedback score reflects the quality that will be received. Specifically, we are interested in the confidence that a high feedback score predicts high quality. We ran a tobit estimation on the Baseline data with quality as the dependent variable and the conventional feedback score as the sole explanatory variable, and used the estimated model to calculate the probability of getting high quality (defined as 90\% or greater) conditional on a given feedback score. We then repeated this exercise for Blind and DSR (again with conventional feedback score as the sole explanatory variable). The results show that high conventional feedback scores are strongly and about equally more informative in Blind and DSR than in Baseline. For example, a conventional feedback score of 10 implies about a 50\% chance of receiving high quality in Baseline, but rises to an 80\% chance in both Blind and DSR. Adding the average DSR feedback score to the DSR tobit forecast changes the probability of receiving high quality as averaged across all feedback scores little (less than a 1\% point increase) – but affects individual forecasts by a substantial amount: the average absolute difference between the probability of receiving high quality forecast on the basis of both conventional and DSR scores versus that forecast with only conventional feedback is 6.4\% points. That is, DSR feedback does what we would hope it would do: separate the performance of traders with the same conventional feedback score.

One interesting question is to what extent the strategic element (blindness) versus the granularity element (5 versus 3-point scale) account for the increased informativeness of DSR feedback relative to baseline conventional feedback. A related question concerns the comparative effectiveness of making DSR versus conventional feedback blind. To answer these questions, we reduced the DSR feedback given by buyers to a three point scale: Scores of 4 or 5 were recoded as "positive", 3 as "neutral" and 1 or 2 as "negative", stripping the DSR information of its granularity advantage over conventional feedback. We then used the recoded scores to compute total feedback scores in the same way that they are calculated using conventional feedback (see Section II.1), producing an encapsulation of DSR information that is directly comparable to the blind conventional feedback score, and holding the method of combining past trading information constant. Adding this as a variable to the Quality Model 2 of Table 6, we can distinguish between the strategic effect of DSR (as accounted for by the new variable) and the granular effect (now accounted for by the \( S \text{ DSR Avg} \) variable). We find both DSR variable coefficients to be positive and significant at the 1\% level. Hence both
strategic and granular factors contribute to the informativeness of DSR information. The coefficient estimate for the strategic DSR variable is nominally larger than that for the conventional feedback blind variable ($S F_{score*} Blind$ in Table 6), although the two effects are not significantly different at any standard test level. Hence, making DSR blind is as effective at encouraging informativeness, along a strategic dimension, as is making conventional feedback blind.

Regarding design implications of our lab study, DSR yields significant efficiency gains over the baseline treatment and does not decrease feedback frequency. Because this is not the case for Blind, at least not significantly so, the experiment suggests that DSR might be the better option for a system change, if buyer moral hazard is of only minor concern. The fact that, in the natural environment, there might be also be path dependency and strategic delay issues with a blind system reinforces this conclusion.

**IV.5 What the combined laboratory and field data tell us**

We close this section with some remarks on the complementary relationship between the experiment and the field data examined in Section III. From the field evidence, we concluded that the feedback in markets with a blind feedback system exhibits the more disperse, more critical pattern that we desire to achieve in the eBay system. At the same time, how relevant these observations are to the proposed systems being evaluated is questionable, primarily because it is difficult to draw firm casual inferences linking the feedback system to larger market performance or even to the feedback dispersion. The experiment enables us to test both proposed systems on a level playing field. Moreover, we can clearly link the changes in the feedback system to the observed increases in feedback informativeness, in bids, in delivered product quality, and finally to overall market efficiency. It is important to note that this clarity is attributable to the tight control the laboratory environment affords, and that this control is achieved by abstracting away from the field environment (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, forthcoming, Plott 1994, Grether, Isaac, and Plott 1981, Kagel and Roth 2000, Chen 2005, Kwasnica, Ledyard, Porter, and DeMartini 2005, Chen and Sönmez 2006, and Brunner, Goeree, Holt, and Ledyard 2010 for similar arguments in the context of auctions, matching, and other markets).

Turning this around, if we look solely at the experimental evidence, we see clear evidence of the hypothesized links between the feedback systems being proposed and improvements in feedback dispersion and market performance. Yet, precisely because the experiment abstracts away from many field complexities, the applicability of the results to the eBay market is questionable. Here the field evidence provides reassurance. At a broad level, we have field examples of feedback systems with performance that is consistent with what we see in the experiment. And at the detailed level, as we pointed out above, the experiment mirrors many qualitative feedback patterns in the field.
Pulling the last two paragraphs together, this largely consistent picture of how feedback systems affect feedback patterns, the field and lab data improve our confidence that we understand how each proposed system, if implemented, would perform. Of course, not all the gaps have been filled. Three gaps arise from simplifying features in our laboratory context that might turn out to be important in the field. First, the one-sided DSR feedback raises the potential of buyer retaliation, important if buyer moral hazard turns out to be a significant concern. The experiment abstracts away from buyer moral hazard, on the assumption it will not be significant, and so does not speak to this concern. Second, in the CF system, feedbacks are posted immediately, so that other buyers can immediately be warned against a seller who becomes untrustworthy (Cabral and Hortaçsu 2010). In contrast, under a blind system, traders can delay the posting of feedback until the feedback deadline is reached, and use this time to deceive buyers. Because our laboratory study did not allow this kind of strategy, the blind system’s performance might be overestimated. Third, in our experiment all buyers are sometimes sellers and so should care about feedback earned in the buyer role. While this holds for a majority of eBay traders, too (section II.1), those eBay buyers who do not plan to become sellers might be less concerned with negative feedback. As a result, our experiment might overestimate the potential for improvement.

V. A first look at the field implementation of detailed seller ratings

EBay decided to go for a detailed seller rating feedback system under the name “Feedback 2.0” in spring 2007.25 Under Feedback 2.0, in addition to the conventional feedback, buyers can leave ratings in four dimensions on a 5 point scale. These dimensions are “How accurate was the item description?”, “How satisfied were you with the seller’s communication?”, “How quickly did the seller ship the item?”, and “How reasonable were the shipping and handling charges?” For each of these ratings, only the number of feedbacks and the average rating are displayed on the seller’s feedback page, and only after the seller receives at least 10 ratings.26 On the feedback submission page eBay emphasizes that only averages and no individual DSRs can be observed. As a result, DSR is not only blind (in the sense that it cannot be responded to) and one-sided (only buyers can give detailed ratings), but also anonymous (sellers cannot identify the DSR provider). In this section we present early evidence on the performance of the new system.

Before we get to the performance of detailed seller ratings (the concern of our main hypotheses), we first look at the performance of conventional feedback (which we did not hypothesize on). Based on our Dataset 1, Figure 5 shows the share of positive (left y-axis) as well as neutral, negative and eventually withdrawn

25 EBay piloted the new design in smaller and medium size eBay markets from early March 2007 (Australia, Belgium, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and UK), and introduced it worldwide in the first week of May 2007.
26 See Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix C for screen shots. Similar to conventional feedback, DSRs are averaged for each buyer before being aggregated. Also, DSRs older than 12 months are ignored, yielding a ‘rolling’ average. There are a number of other small changes implemented jointly with Feedback 2.0. For instance, information about item title and price were added to feedback comments received as a seller.
feedback (right y-axis) for the last 30 weeks before and the first 10 weeks after introduction of DSR in early March 2007 (vertical dashed line). The shares are quite stable, with the exception of the kink about 10 weeks before the system change, which falls into the pre-Holiday shopping time known for high expectations and time pressure. From the week before to the week after DSR introduction we observe a small drop in positive and an accompanying rise in neutral feedback. This is in line with the experimental results on the DSR system, where we also observe a shift from positive to problematic (in particular: neutral) feedback. However, these changes are small compared to the Holiday shock and overall variance, and seem not to be persistent, at least for positive feedback. We also do not observe significant changes in CF (conventional feedback) giving frequency, timing or correlation between the pre-change Dataset 1 and post-change Dataset 2 collected in June 2007. We conclude that, overall, there are no or at best small short-term effects in CF due to the introduction of DSR.

DSRs are given in about 70% of the cases CF is given, varying somewhat by country and category. Further analysis of conditional DSR frequencies (see Table 10 in Appendix C) shows that DSR feedback is given least often (64%-71%) if the CF feedback is negative, and most often (77%-79%) if the CF is neutral.

**Figure 5: Evolution of positive, neutral, negative and withdrawn feedback before and after introduction of Feedback 2.0**

Notes: The figure is based on about 7 and 3 million individual feedbacks in the 30 weeks before and the first 10 weeks after introduction of Feedback 2.0, respectively, in the pilot countries Australia, Belgium, France, Poland and UK. Positive feedback is plotted on the left y-axis, all other feedback on the right y-axis.

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27 We caution that comparison of lab and field data might be diluted because the field data may reflect transitional dynamics while the experiment did not study the migration from one to another system.
For the 27,759 eBay members from Australia, Belgium, France, Poland and UK in Dataset 1, who received at least ten DSRs between the first week of March and data collection in May 2007 (such that their DSR average was published on their feedback profile), we track CF received as a seller in the same period as well as in the two months before DSR introduction (using individual feedback data from Dataset 1). From this feedback we calculated the fictitious percentage positives of CF of each individual seller before and after introduction of Feedback 2.0, using only those feedbacks given in the corresponding time windows.

In line with Figure 5 above, Figure 6 shows that the CF percentage positives scores slightly decreased after introduction of the new system. However, DSRs are more nuanced. For instance, while most sellers have a ‘perfect’ CF reputation of 100%, only very few have a ‘perfect’ average DSR of 5. For comparison we also include the distribution of average scores of Amazon.com marketplace sellers in Figure 6 (based on Dataset 5, see Appendix B). The one-sided DSR feedback distribution follows the one-sided Amazon.com feedback distribution fairly closely, although it seems to be even somewhat more negative. This supports the idea that DSR is treated as a one-sided system, with little scope for reciprocity. In fact, Figure 7 shows that the difference in rating variability between CF and DSR is partly driven by a strategic response to the differences in the scope for reciprocal behavior.

Figure 7 (based on Dataset 2, see Appendix B) shows for each DSR (averaged over the 4 categories) the distribution of the corresponding CFs. As one might expect, when the DSR is 5, virtually all CF is positive, and when the DSR is 4, almost all CF is positive. However, of those buyers who submit the minimum DSR
average of 1 (that means that in the one to four DSR ratings, the buyer either gave only 1s or at least two 1s and at most one 2), about 15% submit a positive CF. For DSR averages of 2, this share is 30%. That is, among those who are maximally unsatisfied measured by DSR, which cannot be reciprocated, a substantial share expresses satisfaction with respect to CF, which can be reciprocated. It seems plausible that at least part of this pattern can be interpreted as hiding bad detailed seller ratings behind a positive open conventional feedback.

The initial concern that this kind of strategic hiding behavior might yield inconsistencies between aggregate CFs and DSRs is not borne out, however. The overall share of DSR averages of 1 or 2 is only slightly less than 2%, so that on average, a positive CF comes with a better DSR.

Strategic feedback hiding is only effective when the seller is not able or not willing to retaliate against such feedback. However, while DSR makes retaliation more difficult, one might still suspect that by permanently observing the changes of average ratings, a seller could be able to identify the buyer behind a given DSR. This hypothesis is not supported by our data. When the buyer gives an average DSR of 1 but a positive CF, the probability that the seller retaliates upon this with a negative CF is 0.004, compared to a retaliation probability of 0.468 when the CF is negative.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.png}
\caption{Distribution of CF conditional on average of corresponding DSRs}
\end{figure}

Notes: To calculate the DSR average we take all available of the up to four DSR ratings per feedback, average and round to integer. Thus, a DSR average of 1 implies two or three ratings of 1 and at most one rating of 2.

\textsuperscript{28} In support of this observation, straightforward regression analyses show a very high correlation between seller’s and buyer’s CF, but when controlling for the buyer’s CF feedback, correlations with DSRs are very low, or even negative.
The experiment suggests that most of the endogenous improvement in performance can be expected from pickier buying. In fact, there is evidence indicating that buyers are indeed more distinguishing under DSR. That is, sellers with a relatively good DSR score have a higher probability of selling listed items after introduction of DSRs than the same sellers before introduction of DSRs, and sellers with a relatively low DSR score have a lower probability of selling with DSRs.29

VI. Conclusions and challenges for future research

This study is a first exploration of the market design issues surrounding the engineering of trust and trustworthiness in the marketplace. The study illustrates how gaming in the production of reputation information can significantly hamper the ability of a reputation system to facilitate trust and trade efficiency. Our analysis began with the observation that reciprocity plays a major role in the leaving, timing and content of feedback. While retaliatory feedback is in itself a rather small phenomenon, accounting for less than 1.2% of the total mutual feedback data (Figure 1), the threat of retaliatory negative feedback distorts feedback in the aggregate. The reason is that buyers respond strategically to the threat, either by not reporting bad experiences or waiting for the seller to report first. This, in turn, reduces the informativeness of feedback information, with the end result that a seemingly small phenomenon can substantially hamper trust and market efficiency.

Our study also speaks to the need for new theory. Our method was to observe the phenomenon in the field as best we could, to design a laboratory study to probe the phenomenon in greater detail and to establish causalities in the laboratory, and then to draw analogies based on the robust findings from field and experimental data. These analogies put the phenomenon in sharper relief and suggest data regularities and questions that any theory of the phenomenon will want to address. A model could usefully describe, for instance, the noise in feedback, such that more compressed feedback makes it harder to correctly predict quality from the reputation score. Moreover, it would also be useful to endogenize the degree of reciprocity in feedback giving in different institutional environments. This may involve utilizing models of reciprocity, social comparison and group identity (see, Chen et al. 2010, and Chen and Li 2009, for related observations). Combining theory and empirical studies will further improve our understanding of the role of behavior and design in reputation building.

Our study also has implications for managing the redesign of market trust systems. First, a major challenge in solving marketplace trust problems has to do with possible adverse side-effects or disruptions in path dependencies in migrating to a new system. For example, a redesign of a trust system need respect the fact that reciprocity has positive as well as negative consequences for the feedback system. The giving of

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29 The effects are statistically highly significant. The data necessary to document this cannot be presented here, eBay asking it be kept confidential (the only data they did not allow us to use in this paper).
feedback is largely a public good, and our data suggest that reciprocity is important for getting mutually satisfactory trades recorded. It is therefore desirable that, in mitigating retaliatory feedback, we strive for a targeted approach rather than one that attempts to remove all forms of reciprocity. Also, by nature, reputation mechanisms are embedded in repeated games, connecting past with future behavior. It was important to the present redesign to maintain certain aspects of the old system, such as the 3-point (conventional) scoring, so that the information collected prior to the change in the system would still be useful in evaluating traders after the changeover, without causing undue confusion.

Second, our laboratory study shows that reciprocal feedback behavior can be channeled, and in a targeted way. The way feedback information is navigated through the system affects whether and how reciprocity influences the candor of feedback. The data show that, compared to a simple open system, both blindness in conventional feedback giving and one-sidedness in a detailed seller rating system increase the information contained in the feedback presented to buyers. As a result, the redesigns likely yield more trust and efficiency in the market, at least in the short-run period that we studied. Additional studies, particularly of longer term effects, should yield further insights.

A third implication has to do with the strength of approaching the problem using complementary methods of analysis. It is the combination and complementary nature of the lab and field data that allows us to be confident in our judgment of likely consequences of institutional changes. With only field data, it would be difficult to establish the influence of institutional differences, because both cross- and within platform comparisons involve confounding environment factors. At the same time, laboratory experiments alone do not capture various complexities of the corresponding field environments. They do, however, demonstrate (beyond their benefits as a test-bed for competing designs) that the interaction of institutions and reciprocal behaviors is sufficient to produce the robust empirical patterns observed in the various data sets. But when taken together, our laboratory and field investigations of different feedback systems provide a surprisingly coherent picture of how institutional change affects social and strategic feedback giving.

EBay introduced ‘detailed seller ratings’ in March and May 2007. Relative to the conventional feedback on eBay, this feedback is more detailed, one-sided and anonymous. The change did not much affect

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30 Laboratory engineering studies can be done on different levels of attention to detail. Our study was not designed to maximally emulate the eBay environment. For instance, eBay’s DSRs are less prominently displayed on eBay (the DSRs are one click away) than in the laboratory experiment. To the extent the presentation is fixed and affects long-run behavior and performance, there is a need to qualify our experimental results for the eBay context. If, for instance, traders do not use DSRs on eBay because they do not see them, our results would overestimate the benefits of DSRs. However, relying recommendations on experience in complicated (‘close to real-world’) environments only comes at a cost. The presentation of the feedback system, for instance, can be quickly changed: if DSRs work better than expected, eBay can decide to place them more prominently. This is why this detail should not affect the basic decision whether or not to change the system. Similarly, we decided to choose a sealed-bid format that abstracts away from eBay’s bidding dynamics, which we did not consider to be of much relevance with respect to feedback dynamics. The experiment design strived for finding a level of detail that does not sacrifice the environmental features relevant to the purpose of study, but at the same time is general enough to generate robust insights into the effectiveness of different feedback systems to diminish retaliation and increase feedback informativeness.
conventional feedback giving, but many traders use the new system to avoid retaliation. This contributes to more reputation dispersion, which in turn leads to improved informativeness.

Naturally, market platforms like eBay continuously monitor and improve trust and trustworthiness on their platform. Motivated by the positive effects of detailed seller ratings, eBay moved ahead and introduced further changes in spring 2008. The most important feature of this more recent change is that sellers are not allowed to submit negative or neutral feedback anymore, only positive. Basically, this is a move to a one-sided feedback system, as found on many business-to-consumer platforms, but still allows for positive reciprocity. Further research will be devoted to how this new change affects the content, timing, and informativeness of feedback. For example, one might expect that, contrary to their behavior in the previous design, more sellers will move first in feedback giving in order to trigger positive reciprocity.

There are other important challenges in designing feedback systems not addressed here. For example, reputation profiles may be tradable, such that new sellers may buy their reputation from the market (see Brown and Morgan 2006). Or traders might change their online identity, or maintain multiple profiles. These factors too, may undermine the informativeness of a feedback system. The engineering approach might usefully be applied to sort potential solutions here as well.
References


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Kalyanam, K. and S. McIntyre (2001), Returns to Reputation in Online Auction markets, Retail Workbench Working Paper W-RW01-02, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA.


Appendix A. Laboratory experiment instructions

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. The specific amount depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. From now on until the end of the experiment, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your place and answer your question privately. In the experiment we use ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) as the monetary unit. 200 ECUs are worth 1 Euro.

At the beginning of the experiment all participants are endowed with an amount of 1000 ECU. Profits during the experiment will be added to this account, losses will be deducted. At the end of the experiment, the balance of the account will be converted from ECUs into Euros according to the conversion rate announced above, and paid out in cash.

The experiment lasts for 60 rounds. In each round, participants will be matched into groups of four participants. One of these participants is the seller, the other three participants are buyers. The composition of the group, and in which rounds you are a seller and in which rounds you are a buyer will be randomly determined by the computer. The seller offers one good which, if produced in 100% quality, costs him 100 ECUs to produce. Each of the potential buyers is assigned a valuation for the good, which lies between 100 and 300 ECUs. The valuation represents the value of the good for the buyer if he receives it in 100% quality (more about quality will be said below). The valuations of the three buyers will be newly randomly drawn in each round. When drawing a valuation, every integer value between 100 and 300 has the same probability to be selected.

Each round consists of three steps: in the “auction stage” the three potential buyers may bid for the item offered by the seller. In the “transaction stage” the seller receives the price which has to be paid by the auction winner, and decides about the quality of the good he will deliver. In the “feedback stage” both buyer and seller may give feedback on the transaction, which is then made available to traders in later rounds. In the following we explain the procedures of the three stages in detail.

Auction stage. In the first stage in each round, each of the potential buyers may submit a maximum bid for the good:

1. Your maximum bid is the maximum amount you’d be willing to pay for winning the auction. If you do not want to participate in the auction, submit a maximum bid of 0. If you want to participate, submit a maximum bid of at least 100 ECUs, which is the minimum price. (Your maximum bid must not exceed the current amount on your account.)
2. The bidder who submits the highest maximum bid wins the auction. The price is equal to the second highest bid plus 1 ECU. Exceptions: The price is equal to 100 ECU if only one potential buyer submits a bid. The price is equal to the maximum bid of the auction winner, if the two highest maximum bids are the same (in this case, the bidder who has submitted his bid first wins the auction).
3. You may think of the bidding system as standing in for you as a bidder at a live auction. That is, the system places bids for you up to your maximum bid, but using only as much of your bid as is necessary to maintain your highest bid position. For this reason, the price cannot exceed the second highest bid plus 1 ECU.

The winner of the auction must pay the price to the seller and proceeds to the transaction stage. All other potential buyers earn an income of 0 ECU in this round.

Transaction stage. The seller receives the price and then determines the quality of the good. The quality must be between 0% and 100%. Each quality percent costs the seller 1 ECU. Thus, the costs for the seller for selling the good are 0 ECU if the quality is 0%, and 100 ECU if the quality is 100%. The value of the good for the buyer who has won the auction equals the quality of the good times his valuation for the good. Thus the value of the good for the buyer is 0 ECU if the quality is 0%, and equal to his valuation if the quality is 100%.

In equations:

The payoff for the Seller in this round equals: Auction price – Quality [%] * 100
The payoff for the auction winner in this round is: Quality [%] * Valuation – Auction price


**Feedback stage**

**Baseline** {The feedback stage consists of one or two steps: After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. If both transaction partners submit feedback, or none of them submits feedback, then the feedback stage ends at this point.

If only one transaction partner submits feedback, then the other transaction partner is informed about this feedback. The transaction partner who has not submitted feedback yet has another chance to submit feedback. Again, submitting feedback costs 1 ECU, and the feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)”, where YY is equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of positive feedbacks in all feedbacks.}

**Blind** {After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. The feedback giving of buyer and seller takes place simultaneously.

After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)”, where YY is equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of positive feedbacks in all feedbacks.}

**DSR:** {The feedback stage consists of one or two steps: After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. Additionally, the buyer (and only the buyer) may submit an additional rating. (This is only possible if he also submits a normal feedback. The additional rating allows the buyer to give feedback on the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The quality was satisfactory.</th>
<th>I strongly disagree</th>
<th>I disagree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no additional costs for the additional rating. If both transaction partners submit feedback, or none of them submits feedback, then the feedback stage ends at this point. If only one transaction partner submits feedback, then the other transaction partner is informed about the “negative”/”neutral”/”positive” feedback; but the seller is not informed about the content of the additional rating submitted by the buyer. The transaction partner who has not submitted feedback yet has another chance to submit feedback. Again, submitting feedback costs 1 ECU, and the feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”.

After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)”, where YY is equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of positive feedbacks in all feedbacks. The additional ratings which a participant received as a seller in earlier rounds will be presented in the following form: “on average X.X, based on XXX additional ratings.”}

Before you start with the experiment you will take part in two trial rounds. In the first trial round you are a buyer, in the second trial round you are a seller. The other buyers/the seller will be simulated by the computer in these trial rounds. The trial rounds have no consequences for your earnings.
Appendix B. List of field data sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>eBay</td>
<td>Transaction data and associated feedback</td>
<td>Nov/Dec 2006</td>
<td>722,929 transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>eBay</td>
<td>Individual feedbacks of all involved traders</td>
<td>From beginning until May 2007</td>
<td>78,045,630 feedbacks under FB1.0 7,060,819 feedbacks under FB2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>eBay</td>
<td>Transaction data and associated feedback, including (publicly unobservable) individual detailed seller ratings</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>573,567 transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mercado Livre, eBay China, others (self-collected)</td>
<td>Transaction data and associated feedback</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>28,435 transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RentACoder.com (self-collected)</td>
<td>Transaction data and associated feedback</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>192,392 transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Amazon (self-collected)</td>
<td>Recent feedback data from 10,000 sellers until 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>320,609 recent feedbacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See http://ben.orsee.org/supplements for a complete description of how these field datasets were created.

Appendix C. Additional tables and figures

<p>| TABLE 8: DETERMINANTS OF FEEDBACK GIVING, PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL EFFECTS (dY/dX) (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50) |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var</th>
<th>Buyer gave feedback</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>(StdErr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.090**</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S FScore</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 2283  Restricted LL: -1226.2

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. S FScore stands for the feedback score of the seller.
TABLE 9: CONTENT AND TIMING OF MUTUAL FEEDBACK
IN EXPERIMENTAL BASELINE TREATMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutually positive feedback</th>
<th>Only seller gave problematic FB</th>
<th>Only buyer gave problematic FB</th>
<th>Mutually problematic feedback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seller gave in stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer gave in stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in cells represent absolute numbers of observations in treatment Baseline.
‘Problematic’ includes negative and neutral feedback.

TABLE 10: BUYER’S DETAILED SELLER RATINGS (DSR) CONDITIONAL ON
BUYER’S CONVENTIONAL FEEDBACK (CF) UNDER FEEDBACK 2.0 [%]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buyer’s CF</th>
<th>DSR Category</th>
<th>DSR given</th>
<th>DSR Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.9%)</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping time</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping costs</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>163.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping time</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping costs</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(96.8%)</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping time</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping costs</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 8: Screenshot of new feedback submission page on eBay**

**Figure 9: Screenshot of new feedback profile page on eBay**